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Abstract
* * * * 
Food assistance programs play an important role in meeting the basic needs of low-
income households.  This paper examines the interaction among food stamps, labor force 
participation and food insecurity status of low-income households under different 
program design and economic conditions. A simultaneous equation model with three 
probit equations links the program, work force participation and outcome. Results based 
on the Survey of Program Dynamics data suggest that Food Stamp Program participation 
is more responsive to changes in the program benefits than to changes in unemployment 
rate or nonlabor income; food insecurity status is more responsive to changes in the food 
program benefit or unemployment rate, than to nonlabor income. 
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Do Food Assistance Programs Improve Household Food Security? : 
Recent Evidence from the United States 
Sonya Kostova Huffman and Helen H. Jensen 
Introduction 
Recent reforms in U.S. welfare policy have shifted significant funding and 
responsibility for welfare assistance from the federal to the state level, and include 
policies to encourage work and limit time on welfare.  As a result of the reforms, the 
Food Stamp Program (FSP) originally designed to help people with low income to obtain 
a nutritionally adequate diet and to alleviate hunger, has become the major federal safety-
net program for low-income households.  For many low-income households, food stamp 
benefits represent an important share of household resources.  Over 19 million people 
participated in the FSP in 2002.  Total FSP costs were $20.7 billion in 2002, with an 
average monthly benefit of $79.60 per person per month (USDA, 2003). 
Although most households in the United States are food secure, in 2001 there were 
11.5 million U.S. households (or 10.7% of all households) that were food insecure (Nord, 
Andrews and Carlson, 2002).  Food insecure households have “limited or uncertain 
availability of nutritionally adequate and safe foods or limited or uncertain availability to 
acquire acceptable foods in socially acceptable ways” (Anderson, 1990; Nord et al., 
2002.)  About one-third of food insecure households (or 3.3 % of all U.S. households) 
were food insecure with hunger.  Our study evaluates the relationship among labor 
supply, food assistance (specifically, the FSP) and food insecurity. The study analyzes 
micro-level data from the Survey of Program Dynamics (SPD) to better understand the 
effect of socio-economic factors, program parameters and labor market participation on   3
food security at the household level.  The results help to explain why some households 
that participate in the FSP find it difficult to sustain food security. 
This study examines the question of whether there is a relationship among FSP, labor 
participation and food insecurity by considering a simultaneous model of program and 
labor market participation, and food insecurity, and makes use of newly available 
household data on social assistance program participation. We expect that program 
participation, labor force participation and household well-being are not independent. The 
ultimate objective of this study is to provide a model of the joint decisions by households 
to participate in food stamps and/or work, and the impacts of FSP and labor force 
participation on well being, as measured by food insecurity with hunger. We choose the 
more severe outcome measure, food insecurity with hunger, to better represent the status 
of households experiencing significant hardship (Anderson 1990; Nord et al. 2002). We 
exploit the simultaneous model structure to account for the endogeneity of the labor force 
participation, FSP participation decisions and food insecurity with hunger, in order to 
evaluate whether the households more likely to participate in the FSP are more likely to 
be food insecure with hunger.  This study is similar to the studies by Gundersen and 
Oliveira (2001) and Jensen (2002) who each use a simultaneous equation model to 
account for endogeneity of FSP participation and food insufficiency (insecurity) of the 
households.  However, we extend the model to include the labor force participation 
decisions of low-income families. We also present the simulated effects of changes in 
policy parameters (food stamps benefit), unemployment rate and nonlabor income on 
FSP participation and food insecurity with hunger in order to interpret the results in light 
of alternative social assistance policies.   4
Literature Review 
A number of earlier studies have examined the determinants of participation in the 
FSP among low-income or FSP-eligible households (see Gleason et al., 1998 and Currie, 
2002 for a literature review). Among other, important and related studies is one by Fraker 
and Moffitt (1988), who model the effect of participation in food stamps and welfare 
programs on labor supply. They estimate that in 1980 the FSP reduced labor supply of 
female heads of families by about 9%. A later study by Hagstrom (1996) on the effect of 
FSP participation on family labor supply finds that the FSP has a weak effect on the labor 
supply of married couples. One surprising finding is that many households do not 
participate in the FSP, or leave the FSP, even though they are eligible to participate 
(Zedlewski and Braumer, 1999; Wilde et al., 2000). 
In the last decade, substantial work on the measurement of hunger and food insecurity 
has been done (e.g., Anderson, 1990; Radimer et al., 1990; Frongillo, 1999; Hamilton et 
al., 1997; Opsomer et al., 1999; Nord et al., 2002). Gundersen and Oliveira (2001) use a 
simultaneous equation model with two probits and show that food stamp participation has 
no effect on food insufficiency. Jensen (2002) finds a positive correlation between food 
stamp participation and food insecurity. Other, previous research shows that food 
insecurity is related to socio-demographic and economic conditions that limit the 
household resources available for food acquisition (Rose et al., 1998; Olson et al., 1996). 
Variables found to be significantly related to food insecurity were adverse health 
conditions, low income, minority status, low education, and food assistance program 
participation.  
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Theoretical model 
We model a household’s labor force, food stamps participation and food insecurity 
with hunger within a utility maximizing framework. A static model of household 
behavior is developed where work and program participation is chosen to maximize the 
household utility function subject to a budget constraint reflecting program transfers. The 
model is used to explain the decisions to participate in FSP and labor markets of a 
population of households potentially eligible for this program.  
Assume that the household’s utility is a function of leisure and disposable income,  




h),                 (1) 
where H is the household head’s hours of work, Y is disposable income, 
￿
f represent 
tastes for receiving food stamps and 
￿
h is the disutility of being food insecure with 
hunger. If stigma is associated with FSP participation then 
￿
f<0. The budget constraint 
gives disposable income: 
Y = wH + N + Pf (Bf(H)-Cf) = PxX,            (2) 
where w is the hourly wage rate per work hour, N is unearned income, Pf is equal to 1 if 
the household participates in FSP and 0 if not, Bf(H) is the benefit function for FSP, Cf 
are the monetary costs associated with FSP participation, X is purchased goods, and Px is 
their price.  Full income, F, is 
F = w
￿  + N + Pf(Bf(H)-Cf) = PxX + wL, or          (3) 
w(
￿  - L) + N + Pf(Bf(H)-Cf) - PxX = 0, 
where 
￿ (=L+H) is the household head time endowment and L is leisure.   6





h) subject to the budget constraint in (3).  The household head chooses the (H, 
Pf) combination that provides the highest indirect utility. 
The optimal choices are 
X
*= dX[w, Px, N, Bf¢(H), Cf, Z],              (4) 
L
*= dL[w, Px, N, Bf¢(H), Cf, Z],              (5) 
H
*= 
￿  - L
*= SH[w, Px, N, Bf¢(H), Cf, Z],            (6) 
Pf
*= dPf[w, Px, N, Bf¢(H), Cf, Z].              (7) 
where Z is a vector of other explanatory variables.  Given these equations, we have also 
the following wage equation: 
w
*=w[H, Z].                  (8) 
Participation in the FSP is not costless. Costs are associated with a family filing an 
application, going for an interview. In addition, Moffitt (1983) suggested that a stigma is 
associated with program participation, and this helps explain the observed lower than 
expected participation rates in Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). For the 
FSP, higher participation costs or stigma include lack of transportation to program offices 
or potential embarrassment at receiving food stamps, an application process that is too 
burdensome (Ohls, 2001), or other significant administrative issues (Zedlewski with 
Gruber, 2001). While the costs and stigma associated with claiming benefits may be 
important, the empirical analysis cannot directly address this issue, however they can be 
explicitly defined as included in a particular error term. 
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Empirical specification and estimation 
The econometric model is a four equation structural model, which allows us to 
examine feedback among endogenous variables. The dependent variables in the model 
are labor force participation (Pl), FSP participation (Pf), food insecurity with hunger (Ph), 
and wage. The first three dependent variables are binary variables and wage is 




* + bl¢Zl + 
￿ l with Pl = 1 if Pl




* + bf¢Zf + 
￿ f with Pf = 1 if Pf




* + bh¢Zh + 
￿ h with Ph = 1 if Ph
** > 0 and 0 otherwise. 
  Although Pl
**, Pf
** and Ph
** are unobservable, we do observe Pl, Pf, and Ph. Define Z 
as a vector of all observed exogenous variables, and Zl 
￿  Z, Zf 
￿  Z, and Zh 
￿  Z, and Zl 
￿  
Zf 
￿ Zh; alh, alf, bl¢, afl, afh, bf¢, ahl, ahf, and bh¢ as parameter vectors; and 
￿ l, 
￿ f and 
￿ h as 
disturbance terms.  Solving for the reduced form we obtain: Pl
*= pl¢Z +nl, Pl = 1 if Pl
* > 0, 
and 0 otherwise, Pf
*= pf¢Z+nf, Pf = 1 if Pf
* > 0 and 0 otherwise, Ph
*= ph¢Z+nh, Ph = 1 if 
Ph
*> 0 and 0 otherwise. 
We use a two-stage estimation procedure similar to the procedure proposed by 
Mallar, 1977. First, we estimate the reduced form or estimate pl, pf, ph by maximum-
likelihood methods applied to each equation. Second, we form the instruments  Z P l l
' * ˆ ˆ p = , 
Z P f f
' * ˆ ˆ p =  and  Z P h h
' * ˆ ˆ p = . Third, we replace Pl
*, Pf
*, and Ph
* on the right hand side of the 
structural equations by the corresponding  Z l
' ˆ p ,  Z f
' ˆ p ,  Z h
' ˆ p  and treat these instruments as 
fixed regressors and the resulting equations as single equation models. We then estimate 
the structural parameters by maximum likelihood applied to each equation separately.    8
The empirical specification of the individual human capital-based wage equation is 
ln(wage) = 





￿ 5O¢+mw,         
where O¢ is a vector of exogenous variables including race, marital status, and labor 
market variables (state unemployment rate); whether the household head is male; and mw 
is a normal random error term. The wage equation also includes a labor-market selection 
variable. 
 
Data and variables 
For the empirical analysis, the first Survey of Program Dynamics (SPD) longitudinal 
data and the 1998 SPD experimental data files are used. The SPD contains detailed 
information about the characteristics of and the choices made by participant and non-
participant households. The longitudinal SPD file provides information on income, job 
participation, program participation, health insurance and utilization, and the well being 
of adults and children during the reference period (1997). Because the longitudinal SPD 
lacks data on assets, the asset information from the 1998 SPD experimental file is merged 
with the SPD longitudinal file. The 1998 SPD experimental data were minimally edited, 
and imputations were not performed for missing data. Table 1 shows the distribution of 
all households by asset level and income.  The assets include the households’ reported 
liquid assets.  About 16 percent of the households in the1998 SPD experimental data file 
did not report their assets; most of these households had income larger than 300 percent 
of poverty.  These households were deleted from our sample. 
The SPD 1998 Food Security Status File contains summary food security status 
information for the households. The food security status variables, available in the file,   9
were calculated based on the 18 core items in the food security module. The food security 
status yields a categorical measure of food security status that identifies households as 
food secure, food insecure without hunger, or food insecure with hunger. In our analysis 
we categorize the households in two groups: first, food insecure with hunger; and second, 
food insecure without hunger and food secure. Information on the state’s annual 
unemployment rate was also included.  
Only non-elderly (ages 18 through 59) household heads are included in the sample 
used in our analysis. Households with income 300 percent of poverty and higher, and 
assets of $5,000 and higher are excluded (the asset limit for FSP is $2,000 and $3,000 for 
households with elderly members). The resulting sample includes 3,733 households with 
low-wealth and low income; 57% are married couple families and 51% have a male 
designated as a household head (weighted data).  Table 2 presents the means and standard 
errors of the sample (weighted) percentage data.  In the sample analyzed, 21% of the 
households participate in the FSP, 81% of the household heads are in the labor force and 
7.7% of the households are food insecure with hunger. Thirteen percent of the households 
have a disabled member.  
Participation in the labor force and FSP differ across the eligible households. 
Households are aggregated into categories according to characteristics that are exogenous 
to (determinants of) their responses to changing program and employment opportunities. 
They are classified in four groups: (1) working, food stamp participant; (2) not working, 
not food stamp participant; (3) not working, food stamp participant; and (4) working, not 
food stamp participant, as shown in Table 3.   10
Table 3 summarizes the main descriptive characteristics of the four groups. The first 
row of the table gives the demographic characteristics of the whole sample. Those who 
work and do not participate in the FSP (Pl=1, Pf=0) are more likely to be male, married, 
white, and have more years of education. Only 18% in this group are food insecure 
households and 5% are food insecure with hunger. The FSP participants who do not work 
(Pf=1,Pl=0) are less likely to be married or to be male, and more likely to have more 
children, have fewer years of education and the smallest amount of nonlabor income. 
They are the most vulnerable group with 55% being food insecure and 20% being food 
insecure with hunger. Food stamp participants (the sixth row) have higher food insecurity 
rates (including food insecure with hunger) than eligible nonparticipants.  Seventeen 
percent of the FSP participating households are food insecure with hunger while only 5% 
of the potentially eligible but nonparticipating in food assistance program households are 
food insecure with hunger. 
 
Empirical Results 
The dependent variables of the empirical model are FSP participation, food insecurity 
with hunger and labor force participation, and ln hourly wage. The simultaneous equation 
model is estimated using an instrumental variable estimator. At the first stage, each 
endogenous variable is regressed on a set of instrumental variables. The instruments 
consist of all exogenous variables in the model. The predicted values for the limited 
dependent variables are the predicted values Z l
' ˆ p ,  Z f
' ˆ p ,  Z h
' ˆ p , rather than the predicted 
probability. In the second stage we substitute for the endogenous variables on the right 
hand side of the system using the predicted values and then estimate the system by probit   11
(FSP, food insecurity with hunger and labor force participation) and least squares (wage 
equation).  
Two sets of estimates for the wage equation are reported in Table 4, one with a 
selection term and one without a selection term. The wage equation is concave in age, 
and the age effect peaks at age 42. The findings on other coefficients are consistent with 
other studies. One additional year of schooling has the direct effect of increasing the 
wage by 3.7%. Added schooling increases wage income through increased labor 
productivity, holding other factors equal. Being male or white also increases an 
individual’s wage. The hypothesis of the joint test of all the nonintercept coefficients, 
except for the coefficient of the selection term, is rejected. The sample value of the F 
statistics is 8.14 (the critical value is 2.01). We estimated a wage equation for the 
household heads that work and then use the predicted wage in the labor force 
participation equation in place of the actual wage as an instrumental variable.  
The structural estimates of the FSP participation, food insecurity with hunger and 
labor force participation are presented in Table 5. All coefficients have the hypothesized 
signs and many are highly significant. Being in the labor force decreases the probability 
of participating in the FSP and the effect is statistically significant. Food insecure with 
hunger households are less likely to participate in the FSP. The higher the food stamp 
benefit is, the higher is the probability of a household being in the FSP. Being married 
decreases the probability of being on food stamps. Having higher nonlabor income makes 
the household less likely to participate in the FSP, and the effect is significant. Being in 
the labor force decreases the probability of being food insecure with hunger and the effect 
is significant. FSP participation decreases food insecurity with hunger.
1 The effect of   12
food stamp participation on a household’s probability of food insecurity with hunger is 
statistically insignificant. Having children increases the probability of being food 
insecure with hunger. Being married decreases the probability of being food insecure 
with hunger. Working is positively related to a higher (predicted) wage and having 
children age between 12 and 18. Being food insecure with hunger decreases the 
probability of working. The choice of working is explained by being married and having 
less nonlabor income. Married males are more likely to work. 
Finally, we present the simulated effects of changes in policy parameters (food 
stamps benefit), unemployment rate and nonlabor income on FSP participation and food 
insecurity with hunger. The simulations are constructed by using the model estimates to 
predict the probabilities of FSP and food insecurity with hunger given the household 
variables (demographic characteristics, nonlabor income, food stamps benefit), predicting 
the probabilities for each observation, and then taking the mean over all observations to 
create average probabilities. Changing the FSP benefit and nonlabor income allows us to 
compare the probabilities of FSP participation and food insecurity under this types of 
transfer payments (food program or cash).  
The baseline estimates are displayed in the first column of Table 6. The predicted 
FSP participation rate is 21% and the predicted households’ food insecurity with hunger 
is 8%. The second column of Table 6 presents the estimated change related to a $100 
increase in the food stamps benefit. This change in the food stamps benefit increases the 
probability of FSP participation by 16.59% and decreases the probability of being food 
insecure with hunger by about 6.67% compared to the baseline. In comparison, Hagstrom 
(1996) found that a 25% increase in the FSP benefit increases food stamp participation by   13
7%.
2 The third column of Table 6 presents the results from a $100 increase in the 
household’s nonlabor income. This change has a small effect on the probability of FSP 
participation (decreases the FSP participation by 0.38%) and on food insecurity with 
hunger (decreases the food insecurity with hunger by 0.41%). The fourth column of 
Table 6 presents the results from a 0.5-percentage point decrease in the state 
unemployment rate. This change in the state unemployment rate decreases the probability 
of FSP participation by 3.5% and the probability of being food insecure with hunger by 
about 2.2% compared to the baseline. 
 
Conclusions 
This study explores the effects of household characteristics on labor force and FSP 
participation choices, and on food insecurity with hunger. The knowledge and 
information gained from the analysis can provide insights on the effects of these 
interventions for individuals and families attempting to achieve financial independence 
and self-sufficiency. The results also provide information on economic, programmatic 
and non-programmatic factors that affect the well being of low-income individuals and 
families, and for better program design. Participation in the FSP differs across the eligible 
households. Our analysis of the data shows that 21% of the potentially eligible 
households participate in FSP.  
The factors that determine the FSP participation are family structure and the food 
stamp benefit level, as well as labor market conditions. An important finding is the 
positive effect of (predicted) wage on work effort. The findings of the model of joint 
FSP, labor force participation and food insecurity with hunger are consistent with our   14
expectations. If the family heads are male or married, then the probability that the 
household participates in the FSP is significantly lower, and the probability that the 
household head works is significantly higher. Household heads with older children are 
more likely to be in the labor force. We found lower FSP participation for married 
families; a negative relationship between food stamps participation and labor supply, and 
between food insecurity with hunger and labor force participation. Increases in food 
stamp benefits increase FSP participation and decrease the food insecurity with hunger. 
These findings imply that FSP participation and food insecurity with hunger among low 
income and low asset households that are potentially eligible for FSP are sensitive to 
changes in program parameters (e.g. food stamp benefit). Relatively greater reductions in 
food insecurity with hunger are achieved through increases in the food stamp benefits and 
improvements in macroeconomic conditions (e.g., lower unemployment rates) than to 
changes in nonlabor income. 
The results show that the linkages among food program participation, labor force 
participation and well-being, measured as food insecurity with hunger, are complex. 
However, the results from the structural estimates and simulations suggest that the 
targeted benefits of the food stamp program reduce food insecurity and are more effective 
than pure cash transfers in doing so.  In the face of the relatively strong effects of changes 
in unemployment on program participation and food insecurity, there is a clear need for 
research that helps to identify effective food program design.     
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Notes 
1.  We also estimated the food insecure with hunger equation with the FSP benefit, 
G, included but the effect was statistically insignificant.  
2.  A 25% increase in the mean FSP benefit in our data set would be approximately 
an increase of $96 per month.  We also evaluate a 10% increase in the FSP benefit 
and in nonlabor income.  The 10% change in FSP benefit led to 6.4% increase in 
FSP participation and 2.64% decrease in food insecurity with hunger; the 10 % 
change in nonlabor income led to 0.38% decrease in FSP participation and 0.41% 
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Table1.  Distribution of the SPD households by asset levels and income 











<100%poverty  31(0.3)  985 (11)  15(0.2)  3(0.03)  14(0.1)  1048(11) 
100-200% poverty  116(1.3)  1385(15)  54(0.6)  15(0.16)  65(0.7)  1635(18) 
200-300% poverty  209(2.3)  1198(13)  96(1.0)  42(0.41)  149(2.0)  1694(18) 
￿ 300% poverty  1104(12.0)  1950(21)  403(4.0)  179(1.90)  1222(13.0)  4858(53) 
Total  1191(15.9)  5518(60)  568(5.8)  239(2.50)  1450(15.8)  7909(100) 
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Table 2.  Definitions of variables, means and standard errors (n=3,084, weighted data) 
Variable  Mean (Standard Error)  Definition 
Age  37.67 (0.20)  Age of household head  
Agesq  1513.4 (15.9)  Age squared  
Schooling  11.70 (0.05)  Years of schooling of household head  
Male  0.51 (0.01)  Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the 
household head is a male, and 0 otherwise  
Married  0.57 (0.01)  Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the 
household head is married, and 0 otherwise 
White  0.76 (0.01)  Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if household 
head is white, and 0 otherwise 
Disabled  0.14 (0.007)  Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if household 
has a disabled member, and 0 otherwise 
Citizen  0.91 (0.005)  Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the 
household head is a US citizen, and 0 otherwise 
Kids6  0.61 (0.02)  Number of children in household who are 
younger than 6 years old in household  
Kids13  0.76 (0.02)  Number of children in household who are age 6 
and 12 
Kids18  0.42 (0.01)  Number of children in household who are 13 and 
younger than 18 years old in household 
Northeast  0.17 (0.008)  Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if household 
lives in the Northeast region, and 0 otherwise 
Midwest  0.21 (0.008)  Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if household 
lives in the Midwest region, and 0 otherwise 
South  0.42 (0.01)  Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if household 
lives in the South region, and 0 otherwise 
UNRATE  5.00 (0.02)  Annual state unemployment rate 
Non labor income  956 (52.93)  Household non labor income exclusive of 
welfare transfers per year in $ 
G  382.94 (2.45)  Maximum FSP grant per month in $, given 
participation 
Ln(wage)  2.06 (0.023)  Natural log of hourly wage  
 
2.10 (0.004)  Predicted value of natural log of hourly wage  
LF participation   0.815 (0.007)  Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if household 
head works, and 0 otherwise 
FSP participation  0.207 (0.008)  Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if household 
participates in FSP, and 0 otherwise 
Food insecure with 
hunger 
0.077 (0.005)  Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if household 
is food insecure with hunger, and 0 otherwise 
Food Security Status  0.74 (0.008)  Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the 
household is food secure, and 0 otherwise 
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Hunger  Male  Married  Educ  White 
 
 
Children  Age 
Nonlabor 
Income 
Sample    3733  26%  8% 51%  57%  11.70  76%  1.79  37.67 9566
Pf=Pl=1  453 45%  14% 31% 30%  11.18  62%  2.22  34.93 9 8551
Pf=Pl=0  373 30%  10% 38% 63%  11.31  77%  1.51   41.161 13061
Pf=1,Pl=0  338 55%  20% 20% 27%  10.56  63%  2.29  38.091 7432
Pl=1,Pf=0  2569 18%  5% 60% 64%  11.99  80%  1.69  37.613 9533
Pf=1  791 49%  17% 26% 29%  10.91  62%  2.25  36.28  8077
Pf=0  2942 20%  5% 57% 64%  11.91  80%  1.66  38.04  9969
Note: Pf=1 if the household participate in FSP and Pf=0 otherwise; Pl=1 if the household 
head works and Pl=0 otherwise; Food insecure includes food insecure without hunger and 
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Table 4.  Estimates of the Individual Log Wage Equation 
Explanatory Variables  ln(wage)  ln(wage) 
Intercept  -0.014 (0.408)
  -0.171 (0.272)
 
Age   0.084 (0.016)
***   0.089 (0.013)
*** 
Agesq  -0.001 (0.0002)
***  -0.001 (0.0002)
*** 
Schooling   0.037 (0.013)
***   0.042 (0.008)
*** 
Married  -0.050 (0.049)
  -0.058 (0.046) 
Male   0.231 (0.094)
**   0.274 (0.046)
*** 
White   0.091 (0.045)
**  0.096 (0.044)
** 
UNRATE  -0.008 (0.022)  -0.015 (0.018) 
Lambda  -0.148 (0.287)
   
R-square  0.05  0.049 
F Statistics  17.68  20.17 
Number of observations  2,698  2,698 
Note:
* Statistically significant at the 10 % level; 
         
** Statistically significant at the 5 % level; 
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Table 5. Structural Estimates of the FSP Participation (Probability of FSP participation), 
Food Insecure with Hunger (Probability of being food insecure with hunger) and Labor 





Food Insecure with 
Hunger 
 
Labor force participation 
Intercept  -0.859 (0.202)
***  -1.023 (0.106)
***  -5.519 (0.772)
*** 
Food Insecure with Hunger  -0.299 (0.143)
**    -1.650 (0.243)
*** 
FSP participation    -0.167 (0.143)
  0.197 (0.168)
 
Labor force participation
  -0.646 (0.059)
***  -0.428 (0.094)
***   
Kids6    0.038 (0.053)
  -0.069 (0.057)
 
Kids13    0.089 (0.047)
*  -0.038 (0.053)
 
Kids18    0.138 (0.045)
***  0.099 (0.049)
** 
Male  0.074 (0.070)
  0.054 (0.133)  -0.584 (0.155)
*** 
Married  -0.913 (0.089)
***  -0.514 (0.143)
***  -0.676 (0.138)
*** 







  -0.045 (0.163)
  0.747 (0.141)
*** 
) ˆ ln( ge a w       2.336 (0.332)
*** 
G  0.002 (0.0002)
***     
Citizen  -0.029 (0.089)     
Disabled      -0.682 (0.163)
*** 
Northeast    -0.020 (0.099)   
Midwest     0.005 (0.099)   
South    -0.009 (0.084)   
       
Log Likelihood  -1626.98  -974.38  -1,372.16 
Number of observations  3,733  3,733  3,733 
Note: 
* Statistically significant at the 10 % level; 
          
** Statistically significant at the 5 % level; 
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Table 6. Simulated Changes in FSP Benefit, Nonlabor Income and Unemployment Rate 
(absolute and percent changes in parentheses) 
   
Base 
$100 increase in 
FSP benefit 
$100 increase in 
Nonlabor income
 
Decrease in Unemployment 
Rate by 0.5 percentage point 
Probability of FSP 
participation 






Probability of food 
insecurity with hunger 
0.0809  0.0755 
(-0.0054, -6.67%) 
0.0805 
(-0.0003, -0.41%) 
0.0791 
(-0.0018, -2.18%) 
 